Is Ukraine ready to shift its offensive to Crimea? Overnight, two blasts further destabilized the Kerch Bridge, one of Vladimir Putin’s pet projects and a symbol of Russian claims for the strategic peninsula. More importantly, Ukraine’s successes in Kherson have made the Kerch Bridge the only reliable ground line of communication (GLOC) to their forces in Crimea.

Ukraine tried to take it out in October, and said at the time that it was “just the beginning.” Nine months later, is this the second step — or just an attack of opportunity? As CNN notes, this time Ukraine has claimed credit for the attack, unlike the attack in October, which makes it appear more significant than a one-off:

A Ukrainian security official has claimed Kyiv’s responsibility for an attack on the bridge linking the annexed Crimean peninsula to the Russian mainland – a vital supply line for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine and a personal project for President Vladimir Putin.

The nearly 12-mile crossing, also known as the Kerch Bridge, is the longest in Europe and holds huge strategic and symbolic importance for Moscow. Monday’s attack on the bridge was the second since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, after a fuel tanker exploded while crossing it in October.

A source in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told CNN this attack was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukraine’s naval forces. The source spoke on condition of anonymity because they had not received authorization to speak on the record.

The images in the video show the roadway over the Kerch Bridge, but it also has a rail line that is even more critical for Russia. That is their only reliable supply/logistics connection to Crimea after the Ukrainian advance around Kherson, and now especially after the demolition of a dam in the region has complicated maneuverability for both sides.

But even if Russian troops control the territory between the Donbas and Crimea, their lines are too exposed to successfully maintain significant shipments along those GLOCs. Furthermore, some of their own supplies have apparently been coming through the Kerch Bridge and southeastern Crimea, according to CNN’s analysts. That makes their situation in the broader Kherson theater even more tenuous than before. The bridge isn’t completely severed, which is undoubtedly disappointing for the Ukrainians, but it’s destabilized enough now that it will take time and effort to restore it — while the Ukrainians might still take more shots at it. Anything Russia sends across that bridge in any substantial amount has a likelihood of ending up in the Kerch Strait along with any surviving elements of the bridge.

It’s pretty clear that the October strike turned out to be a target of opportunity. Ukrainians managed to take back Kherson a month later, but never made a serious attempt at invading/liberating Crimea. This looks more significant, for a couple of reasons. First off, Ukraine has come under pressure from its Western supporters to do something with all of their new materiel while Ukraine has for now adopted a very incremental and careful approach to its counter-offensive. By taking credit for this Kerch Bridge attack, they are making it look strategic rather than opportunistic — and there’s only one long-term strategy it would support.

Second reason: this forces the Russians to stretch their forces out more with less materiel and support. This could just be another feint toward Crimea, but Russia can’t assume that. They may have to transfer more units from Donbas to the Kherson lines to prevent an invasion of Crimea, but that would weaken an already faltering situation in that region. The Russians have to guess where Ukraine will throw their real counteroffensive punch, and Crimea may well be the target, for both political and military reasons. With Russia pulling out of the grain deal this morning, stripping their navy of their Crimean resources might be even more mission critical for Kyiv today.

This couldn’t come at a worse time for the Kremlin. After the aborted rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Ministry of Defense has begun purges in the combat regions of occupied Ukraine, ISW reported last night:

The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort. The recent dismissal of 58th Combined Arms Army Commander (CAA) Colonel General Ivan Popov and the reported dismissal of 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov prompted further discussions of other alleged recent dismissals and arrests.[1] Russian sources amplified an alleged audio message from personnel of the 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division on July 15 in which the personnel claimed that the Russian military command dismissed 7th VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev in early July.[2] Russian sources also claimed that Russian authorities arrested 90th Tank Division (Eastern Military District) Commander Major General Ramil Ibatullin as well as two unspecified deputies on an unspecified date.[3] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger suggested that the Russian military command is also planning to dismiss the 31st VDV Brigade Commander, who is reportedly Colonel Sergei Karasev.[4] Russian sources speculated that the Russian MoD may be preparing to arrest VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.[5] ISW has not observed confirmation of Seliverstov’s and Kornev’s dismissals nor of Ibatullin’s arrest, although these claims follow a pattern similar to that of previous claims of command changes that have proven true.[6]

These formations and units are conducting defensive and offensive operations in key sectors of the front in Ukraine. The 58th CAA has conducted a relatively successful defense against Ukrainian counteroffensives in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the 106th Division is committed to defending against Ukrainian assaults on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.[7] ISW has observed elements of the 7th VDV Division deployed to east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge as well as to unspecified areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] Russian milbloggers have claimed that the 31st VDV Brigade is also defending in the Bakhmut direction and that elements of the 90th Tank Division are involved in ongoing limited assaults west of Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast.

If the Ukrainians have the resources for a big offensive at the ready, and that is still an “if,” the time is ripe to unleash it. If it’s coming in Crimea, we should know soon.